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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, In the Interest 
of H , F R (06-24-65) a 
person under eighteen years of age. 
F R H , by his next of kin 
and friends and custodians JOSE LUJAN 
and MAGGIE LUJAN, 
Plaintiffs and Appellant, 
vs. 
MARILYN BAKER, CHRIS V. SAIZ and 
MRS. CHRIS V. SAIZ, his wife, 
Defendants and Respona 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal brought by the Appellants, Jose and Maggie 
Lujan, from an order entered in the Second District Juvenile Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah denying the petition for extraordi-
nary writ and keeping custody and guardianship of F R 
H in the Utah State Division of Family Services. 
Civil No. 
13918 
lents. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Plaintiff-Appellants, Jose Lujan and Maggie Lujan, 
petitioned the Third Judicial District Court, Honorable Jay E. 
Banks, presiding, for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of the minor 
child F R H At a hearing before the court on 
September 24, 1974, the Court ordered "that the question of 
custody and guardianship of F R H be and is hereby 
certified to the Second District Juvenile Court, State of Utah, 
based upon Utah Code Annotated 55-10-78." (R. 38) The 
Juvenile Court, the Honorable Judith F. Whitmer, presiding upon 
proper hearing, did find and order that custody of the child F 
R H was continous since 1971, that the Petitioners did 
not have standing to bring the petition, and that the child was not 
being illegally detained as indicated by hearings and orders entered 
by the Juvenile Court in 1971. Therefore, the petition for writ of 
habeas corpus was denied by the Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the order entered denying the 
writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the Petitioner-Appellants 
did not have standing and that the child was not being illegally 
detained. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Shortly after the birth of F R H , the Petitioners 
Jose and Maggie Lujan, the great uncle and great aunt of the child, 
took F R H into their home to take care of him and 
provide him with the necessities of life (R. 40). In 1971, the 
Second District Juvenile Court, the Honorable Judge Regnal 
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Garff, presiding, permanently deprived the natural parents of any 
and all rights in the child, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 55-10-109, and placed custody of him in the Division of 
Family Services. (R. 2) 
Thereafter, the Division of Family Services executed a valid 
agreement with the Petitioners Jose and Maggie Lujan making the 
Lujans the Foster Parents of F R H with the right 
that either party — with notice — could remove the child or have 
him removed from the Lujan Home. (R. 5) 
In 1974, the Division of Family Services, pursuant to the rights 
of custody of F R H , made the decision to take 
F R H out of the home of Petitioners and place him 
in the home of defendants Mr. and Mrs. Chris V. Saiz. To 
effectuate this change, Defendant Marilyn Baker, a Social Worker 
for the Division of Family Services placed the child in the Saiz's 
home. All the foregoing was done with notice to the Petitioners (R. 
5) and by Court order dated September 5, 1974. 
Thereafter, the Petitioners, without right or authority, took 
F R H out of the home of defendants, Saiz, and 
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Third Judicial District 
Court. In the meantime, Michael Stead, Attorney for the County, 
filed an affidavit and order to show cause why the Petitioners 
should not be held in contempt of court regarding the removal of 
the child and why they should not relinquish physical custody of 
said child (R. 33). Hearing on this order was never held and all 
parties came before the Court on the Petitioner for writ of habeas 
corpus. 
The Juvenile Court found, as per the findings of fact, that the 
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Petitioners did not have standing since they had no rights in the 
child, that the child was not being illegally detained, and that the 
petition for writ of habeas corpus should be denied. 
From this order, the Appellants appeal the decision of the 
Juvenile Court. Respondents respectfully refer the court to 
§55-10-78, Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as amended, 1965) 
wherein it is specified that the name of the child shall not appear on 
the record in an appeal from the Juvenile Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
CHANGING THE HEADING OF THE CASE AT 
BAR IN LIGHT OF THE COURT'S CONTINUING 
JURISDICTION OF THE MATTER OF CUSTODY 
OF THE MINOR CHILD. 
The Appellants make an attempt to show through statutory and 
constitutional language that the District Court has exclusive juris-
diction for the extraordinary writs as sought in the case at bar. In so 
doing, Utah Code Annotated, Section 55-10-78 is cited, but only 
in part. Had the Appellants cited the entire statutory language of 
the pertinent portion of that section, there would be no question 
that the Juvenile Court acted properly in changing the name of the 
case to that which showed the proper Juvenile Court relationship. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 55-10-78, provides: 
"Nothing contained in this act shall deprive the district 
courts of jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for a child, 
nor of jurisdiction to determine the custody of a child 
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upon writ of habeas corpus or when the question of 
custody is incidental to the determination of a cause in 
the district court; 44provided that in case a petition 
involving the same child is pending in the juvenile court 
or the juvenile court has previously acquired continuing 
jurisdiction over the same child, the district court shall 
certify the question of custody to the juvenile court for 
determination." (emphasis added) 
The record clearly indicates the order of certification to the 
Second District Juvenile Court (R. 38) was entered for the deter-
mination of the entire matter, since the only matter before the 
District Court was whether the Lujans had any custody to assert. 
The Juvenile Court had continuing jurisdiction of the minor child 
pursuant to the order entered by the same court, Judge Garff 
presiding, in 1971, and as such the District Court deferred to that 
already existing jurisdiction of the Court and as per Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 55-10-78 certified the entire matter to the 
Juvenile Court. 
The Appellants do not raise the issue of continuing jurisdiction 
on appeal, nor was it contested in the Juvenile Court. Therefore, it 
must be assumed by the Respondent that objection to such jurisdic-
tion is waived by Appellants. 
This indicated most clearly that the District Court acted prop-
erly in the certification, and that the Juvenile Court properly 
changed the titled of the case to show the status in the Juvenile 
Court. 
Nevertheless, the mere change of title or heading is not 
paramount to the issues involved in this appeal. This issue is not 
material to the disposition of the case, but if this court should find 
5 
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that the Juvenile Court erred in its action, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 61 should apply. This rule states that: 
"No error in either the admission or the exclusion of 
evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order or 
in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the 
parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise 
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take 
such action appears to the court inconsistent with sub-
stantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceed-
ing must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding 
which does not affect the substantial rights of the par-
ties." 
It is therefore seen that Argument I of the Appellants is without 
merit and must therefore be dismissed. 
POINT II 
NO EVIDENCE WAS NEEDED FOR THE DISPOS-
ITION OF THE PETITION SINCE THE ORDER 
WAS MADE ON LEGAL RATHER THAN 
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES. 
Appellants totally fail to distinguish the difference between 
dismissing a case on "legal" issues as compared to dismissing a 
case on "factual" evidence. When it is clearly understood that the 
case at bar was dismissed on a " legal'' issue — standing — there is 
no need for evidence to be introduced which would go to the merits 
of the petition. 
Page 10 of Appellants Brief states as follows: 
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"The appellants were deprived of the privilege of 
showing that the juvenile court never had jurisdiction 
and to show the fact that Roger was never a neglected or 
dependent child." 
The fact is simply that the jurisdictional question was decided 
in 1971 before Judge Garff and that the time for appeal had long 
since run, thus precluding this argument from being raised. The 
Court had jurisdiction originally, and has since continued such 
jurisdiction — even to the granting of the order to remove the child 
from the home of the Lujans. This issue is long since waived. 
The Juvenile Court further declared, as the Respondents wish 
to emphasize, that the Appellants never have had legal custody 
(other than physical custody) since the parents were still alive and 
in 1971 the Court terminated all such parental rights and placed the 
child in the custody of the Division of Family Services. 
The cases cited by Appellants, therefore, do not bear on the 
question before this Court on appeal. No one is contending that the 
Lujans did not care for the child as was the issue in In Re Bradley 
et.al.v. Miller et.ux., 109 Utah 538, 167 P.2d 978 (1946) as cited 
by Appellants, but rather the Court herein stated: 
"Well, the question is what rights do they have. You 
see, that's what Mr. Stead is saying. They have no 
rights. Based on that foster care agreement that they 
signed, the arrangement could be terminated at any 
time, at the option of Family Services, not. . . .Yes, 
yes, sure I think everybody recognizes the equitable 
aspects of this whole thing but just based on strict legal 
interpretation. I don't think they have any standing. 
We've never held that a foster parent had any standing 
here." (R. 9) 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Further, the Court said: 
"Look, Mr. Robbins, this is what I'm stuck with. I'm 
stuck with Judge Garffs order dated March 9, 1971, 
which reads as follows. 'All parental rights of the 
mother and the father are permanently terminated and 
legal custody and guardianship of the person of the 
above child is placed with the Utah State Division of 
Family Services, a licensed child-placing agency for 
placement in a suitable adoptive home. The Division of 
Family Services is hereby ordered to pay for the support 
and maintenance of said child until the adoptive place-
ment is made.' That's what I've got and that's what 
we're dealing with and what I feel personally, what the 
moral issue is — you know. That's what I meant when I 
said I am stuck with this order. And the child is not 
being illegally detained by any stretch of the imagina-
tion because Family Services has legal custody. And 
what I feel I have to do and what I would like to do are 
two different things." (R. 13) 
As indicated above, the legal issue of standing and prior continu-
ing custody controlled in the Juvenile Court. These are legal issues 
where no factual evidence is needed. The Court dismissed the case 
for these reasons. 
Because of the continuing nature of the Court's jurisdiction, 
Judge Whitmer and Attorney Robbins had the following dialogue: 
"Judge Whitmer: 
Well, all I'm saying is that I don't think a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus is the proper way to get it before the 
Court because the child is not being illegally detained. 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Golden Robbins: 
Well, it was. Today, it's not. It's in the custody of the 
Lujans but the day that the Writ was issued it was in the 
custody or the possession of Mrs. Baker and Mrs. Saiz. 
Judge Whitmer: 
Who has every right to pick up that child from any 
foster placement. 
Golden Robbins: 
Which I'll have to disagree with, your honor. I don't 
think they have a right to take it from the Lujans. They 
might have the right, I don't know what rights they do 
have to be very frank with you but. . . 
Judge Whitmer: 
That agreement indicates there that the foster place-
ment can be terminated at reasonable notice by either 
party and they are a party to that agreement. They have 
been receiving foster care payments from the Division 
of Family Services since the child was placed there." 
(R.7) 
Thus from a legal standpoint, the Lujans had no rights upon 
which to remain in Court and the Court properly granted the 
motion to dismiss propounded by the Defendants, which motion 
needed no evidence as claimed by the Appellants. 
9 
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POINT III 
THE JUVENILE COURT HAD PROPER JURIS-
DICTION OVER THE LUJANS AND THE QUES-
TION RAISED REGARDING JURISDICTION 
OVER F R___ H IS IMPROPERLY 
RAISED ON APPEAL. 
At the outset of Point II, Appellants claim there is an Order to 
Show Cause erroneously in the records, yet use this appeal as the 
forum to propound their position relative to it. Respondents con-
tend that this entire segment of Appellants' Brief is improperly 
before this Court. 
The issue presented to the Juvenile Court by Appellants was 
whether the placing of F R H with a new Foster 
Family detained him illegally — hence the petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus. Point III of the Appellants' Brief does not speak to 
that issue but attempts to attack the original jurisdiction over the 
child more than 3 years after time for appeal in that original action 
had run. Utah Code Annotated, Section 55-10-112 sets forth the 
only criteria by which jurisdiction or other objections can be made 
and/or challenged, on appeal. At the time of the original order in 
1971 no appeal was taken, jurisdiction was not challenged and as 
the record indicated (R. 10) all parties with rights and interests in 
the outcome of the action were at those original hearings and had 
every opportunity to follow Utah procedure to effectuate chal-
lenges. 
Further, there is no indication that the Lujans complained of 
jurisdiction when the Division of Family Services placed F 
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R H in their home, or when they signed the contractual 
agreement with the Division that gave the Division authority to 
remove F R H upon due notice. Instead, through 
petitioning for an extraordinary writ they are attempting to attack 
collaterally the proper original jurisdiction over the child and their 
acquiescence in the entire proceedings. Simply because the Divi-
sion of Family Services exercised its option under the agreement 
with Court approval to their disadvantage does not give the Lujans 
the right, or make them proper parties, to raise these issues at this 
time. This Court has consistently held that the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus is not a substitute for appellate review. In State v. Morgan, 
U.2d , 527 P.2d 226 (1974) this Court held: 
"The writ of habeas corpus cannot be used for the 
purpose of procuring what in substance and effect is a 
second appeal, whether it is prosecuted pending the 
appeal or thereafter." (Emphasis added) 
In this present action, the Appellants are trying to raise issues 
that were never originally appealed more or less after an appeal had 
been taken. This is totally improper with the dictates of this court 
and should be disregarded as bearing on the issue of standing and 
dismissal of the petition. 
The Appellants state in their brief on Page 11: 
' ' If there had been any part of the Juvenile Court record 
put in evidence, the Appellants would have contested 
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court." 
None of this record alluded to was introduced in evidence, yet 
the Appellants complained about something that was not and is not 
in the record and is not pertinent to the entire matter. The petition 
11 
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was dismissed on legal grounds as expressed in Point II and did not 
need go to the introduction of evidence. The Appellants cannot 
now claim that the Court should take judicial notice of something 
that is not in the record. The Appellants fail to point out to this 
Court why they are the proper parties to raise the petition and 
where the Court erred in dismissing the action. 
Regarding jurisdiction of the Lujans as raised by Appellants 
the thrust of the contention is confusing; Respondent presumes 
reference is made to the present action. If this is a correct presump-
tion, they filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in District 
Court, thereby subjecting themselves to jurisdiction of that Court. 
That Court properly certified the question to the Juvenile Court. 
The fact that the petition was brought by Appellants in behalf of 
F R H gives the Court complete jurisdiction over 
them, for once the Court has jurisdiction over the minor (which it 
did, here) those guardians, next friends, etc., likewise are under 
the jurisdiction of the Court. 
If, by chance, the Appellants are referring to the 1971 hearing, 
the Lujans never had any rights in the case at that time, for legal 
custody of the child was the issue before the Court and before 
parental rights were terminated such legal custody was in the 
natural parents and not the Lujans. The Lujans were not required to 
have a day in Court because they had no legal rights to assert. The 
Juvenile Court made this extremely clear as Page 9 of the record: 
Golden Robbins: 
But I don't think, I don't think the Court, the Juvenile 
Court, doesn't have any jurisdiction in the first place in 
these proceedings that you have out here that those are 
12 
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not a jurisdictional question. The Lujans were not made 
a party to those proceedings. 
Judge Whitmer: 
They are not entitled to be. 
Michael Stead: 
They don't have to be made a party. 
Judge Whitmer: 
They don't have to be made a party. 
Golden Robbins: 
Well, I don't think you can take anybody's rights away 
from them without. . . . 
Judge Whitmer: 
Well, the question is what rights do they have. You see, 
that's what Mr. Stead is saying. They have no rights. 
Based on that foster care agreement that they signed, 
the arrangement could be terminated at any time, at the 
option of Family Services, no . . . " 
Further, the record is clear, that Appellants were attempting to 
use habeas corpus as a method to challenge the purely administra-
tive decision of the Division of Family Services which has nothing 
to do with the child being illegally detained. Mr. Robbins, counsel 
for Appellants, stated: 
"I was hoping that we could get the evidence in as to 
the care of the infant and . . . " (R. 8) 
13 
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Thereafter Judge Whitmer responded: 
"I don't think anybody is arguing that the Lujans have 
not been adequate foster parents up to this point. If they 
hadn't been, Family Services would have removed the 
child. That's not the point. I think that the Family 
Services made an administrative decision based on the 
age and health of the Lujans." (R. 8) 
The attempt to get such evidence in is surely an attempt to get 
the Juvenile Court to over turn the Division of Family Services 
order without going through the process of appealing the decision 
of the Division directly. The use of habeas corpus as the substitute 
for petitioning the Division for the reconsideration of the facts 
relative to care and support of the child (which was not done here 
as far as the record indicates) is improper. 
As the Court pointed out on Page 6 and 7 of the records: 
Judge Whitmer: 
The point is that Family Services administratively can 
do anything they want to. I suppose that the Lujans 
might have some kind of. . . .1 don't know whether a 
civil action against Family Services would lie for dam-
ages. That' another issue. But, on the issue of illegal 
detention, the child is in the custody of Family Ser-
vices, not in the custody of the Lujans, and Family 
Services simply move, in effect, out of a foster home,, 
which they have every right to do." 
* * * 
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"Well, all I'm saying is that I don't think a writ of 
habeas corpus is the proper way to get it before the 
Court because the child is not being illegally de-
tained." 
Thus, it is clearly seen that the cases cited by appellants to 
support their contention regarding "neglected, dependent, or de-
linquent" children which would allow the Juvenile Court to in-
voke jurisdiction (In re State in the Interest of Graham, 110 Utah 
159, 170 P.2d 172 (1946)) add nothing to the issues before this 
Court, for there is nothing in the entire record which would allow 
this Court to make a decision thereon. 
Respondent respectfully urges this Court to recognize the 
actual issue before this Court—why the petition was dismissed — 
and disregard the points raised by Appellant which do not bear on 
that decision. This Court has long held that issues not presented for 
the trial judge to rule on may not be raised on appeal. State v. 
Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965). 
POINT IV 
THE JUVENILE COURT RULED PROPERLY 
THAT THE CASE AT BAR NEED NOT BE RE-
TURNED TO THE DISTRICT COURT FOR 
FURTHER DETERMINATION. 
Appellants focus their final argument and case law support on 
the wrong provision of Utah Code Annotated, Section 55-10-78. 
There are two mutually exclusive provisions pertaining to custody 
matters and the Appellants have not reached the crucial language 
which is dispositive of this case. Appellants quote State of Utah in 
15 
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the Interest ofRae Lyn Thornton, 18 Utah 2d 297, 422 P.2d 199 
(1967) as support for their view that the Juvenile Court is required 
to send the case back to the District Court. That case interpreted the 
one provision of Utah Code Annotated, Section 55-10-78 which 
states: 
"A district court may at any time decline to pass upon a 
question of custody and may certify that question to the 
juvenile court for determination or recommendation." 
This provision was instituted primarily for situations where the 
Juvenile Court had no relationship with the parties and when the 
District Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the 
parties. It is a matter quite understandable that the District Court 
might desire to have the expertise of the Juvenile Court help in the 
determination of the interests of the minor children. But neither 
Thornton nor Anderson v. Anderson, 18 Utah 2d 89, 416 P.2d 308 
(1966), nor In re State in the Interest of Valdez, 29 Utah 2d 63, 504 
P.2d 1372 (1973) cited by Appellants, is a situation where the 
Juvenile Court already had jurisdiction over the matter before the 
case was filed in District Court. Surely, those cases are correct in 
their analysis that if the Juvenile Court has nothing to do with the 
parties, the subject matter, or the case at all, the District Court 
cannot divest itself of jurisdiction. 
In the present action, however, the Juvenile Court had continu-
ing jurisdiction over the entire matter before, during, and after the 
time when the petition was filed in District Court. Therefore, the 
provision, which the cases cited above interpret, is not pertinent or 
applicable to this case. As cited earlier under Respondent's Point I, 
the following language of Utah Code Annoted, Section 55-10-78 
is the applicable statute: 
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"Nothing contained in this act shall deprive the District 
Courts of jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for a child, 
nor of jurisdiction to determine the custody of a child 
upon writ of habeas corpus or when the question of 
custody is incidental to the determination of a cause in 
the district court; provided that in case a petition involv-
ing the same child is pending in the juvenile court or the 
juvenile court has previously acquired continuing 
jurisdiction over the same child, the district court shall 
certify the question of custody to the juvenile court for 
determination/' (Emphasis added) 
If the above language was to mean nothing different from that 
language cited by Appellant, then the whole purpose of "spelling 
out" the procedure when the Juvenile Court already had prior 
continuing jurisdiction would be moot. Such an interpretation 
cannot be reached. The legislature specifically enacted the above 
language to require by use of the command "shall certify" that the 
District Court transmit the entire proceedings if the issue in the writ 
involves only the child and the Juvenile Court had prior continuing 
jurisdiction. 
InAnderson, supra, the Court said that when the District Court 
"has taken jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court may 
be invoked.. .but its action must be regarded as supplementary to 
the action of the District Court.'' This is in total harmony with the 
position of Respondent and the language of the statute for when the 
Juvenile Court already has jurisdiction over the minor child, any 
writ of habeas corpus must be certified to the Juvenile Court for 
matters concerning custody, for otherwise the District Court 
would be usurping its position to defeat the entire purpose of the 
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Juvenile System as it relates to wards of the state and in effect all 
persons who are in the custody of the Division of Family Services. 
Therefore, Respondent strongly opposes Appellants argument 
and urges that the foregoing analysis is correct and proper and that 
this Court reject the contention of Appellants. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondent respectfully submits that the certification of 
the petition for writ of habeas corpus to the Juvenile Court was 
proper, that the case was decided on a legal point not requiring the 
introduction of evidence, and that this case under the foregoing 
circumstances need not be referred back to the District Court for 
further proceedings. 
Therefore, it is urged that this Court affirm the decision of the 
Juvenile Court. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
FRANK V. NELSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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